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Measurement-induced focusing and the magnitude of loss aversion:
The difference between comparing gains to losses and losses to
gains
Fieke Harinck∗ Ilja Van Beest† Eric Van Dijk‡ Marjolijn Van Zeeland‡
Abstract
Research has identified loss aversion as a strong and robust phenomenon, but has also revealed some moderators
affecting the magnitude of its effect on decision making. In the current article, we draw attention to the fact that
even the measurement of loss aversion itself may affect its magnitude by inducing a focus on either losses or gains.
In three studies, we provide empirical evidence for such a measurement-induced focus. In all studies we used coin-
toss gambles—in which there is a 50/50 chance to win or to lose—to assess gain/loss ratios as a measure of loss
aversion. Participants either filled out the loss side or the gain side of this gain/loss ratio. The studies consistently
showed that—using within- and between-subject designs and anticipated and real coin-toss gambles—the strength of loss
aversion depended on the measurement format (fill-in-the-loss versus fill-in-the-gain); filling in the loss side increased
loss aversion. Moreover, loss aversion was more affected by the stakes of the gamble in the fill-in-the-loss format than
in the fill-in-the-gain format.
Keywords: loss aversion, focus, coin-toss gamble, measurement, format.
1 Introduction
When making decisions, decision-makers have to con-
sider the potential outcomes, and thus consider the poten-
tial losses and gains that may occur. For example, when
speculating on the stock exchange, we have to consider
the potential losses (should stock go down) and the po-
tential gains (should stocks go up). When making such
decisions—especially when people directly compare po-
tential losses and gains—people often give more weight
to the losses (e.g., Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; Kliger &
Levit, 2009; McGraw, Larsen, Kahneman & Schkade,
2010). This larger weight given to negative outcomes is
generally referred to as loss aversion, i.e., “losses loom
larger than gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Liber-
man, Idson, & Higgins, 2005; Tversky & Kahneman,
1991, 1992; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). In addition to stock
market decisions, loss aversion has been used to explain
many effects observed in the context of decision making
such as the sunk cost effect (e.g. Arkes & Blumer, 1985),
the status quo bias (Knetsch, 1989; Schweitzer, 1994),
and the endowment effect (e.g. Kahneman, Knetsch &
Thaler, 1990; Van Dijk & Van Knippenberg, 1998).
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Although the existence of loss aversion is well-
accepted, there is still work to be done developing bet-
ter accounts of its causes, boundaries and consequences.
For example, researchers generally assume that poten-
tial gains need to be approximately twice as large to off-
set the potential losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).
They introduced a loss aversion coefficient—the ratio
G/L (Gains/Losses) that makes an even chance to gain
G or lose L just acceptable (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991,
page 1053). They observed a gain/loss ratio of 2 (2/1) in
their experiments, showing that gains on average need to
be twice as large as the losses to make an even chance to
gain G or lose L acceptable. In the current paper, how-
ever, we will argue and show that this loss aversion ratio
is not constant, but in fact influenced by how it is mea-
sured. We show that the ratio is approximately 2 when
people focus on gains compared to a loss, but that the ra-
tio increases when people focus on losses compared to a
gain. We thus show that the measurement of loss aver-
sion itself can induce a focus on either losses or gains,
and that this measurement-induced focus influences the
strength of loss aversion.
1.1 Explaining and measuring loss aversion
Loss aversion has been linked to the negativity bias (see
for overviews e.g. Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Baumeister,
Bratlavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). This link first of
all shows that the overweighing of the negative is not re-
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stricted to the domain of decision-making. In more gen-
eral terms, the negativity bias describes that people pay
more attention to negative information than to positive in-
formation. For the current purposes, it is also interesting
to see that the research on the negativity bias shows that it
is possible to redirect a person’s attention from negative
information to positive information (Beck & Clark, 1997;
Compton, 2000; Derryberry, 1993; Derryberry & Reed,
2002; Teasdale, Segal & Williams, 1995; Toates, 1983).
Moreover, Schoemaker (1982) noted quite early that peo-
ple’s choices are sensitive to how the problem or decision
is presented. Translated to the domain of loss aversion,
these insights indicate that the magnitude of loss aver-
sion may depend on whether people are focused on the
negative or the positive.
In the current article, we draw attention to an important
consequence of this reasoning, namely that the measure-
ment of loss aversion itself may already induce a focus on
the negative or the positive. In the studies that follow we
show this phenomenon of what we call “measurement-
induced focusing” for one of the most common ways to
measure loss aversion: The assessment of gain-loss ra-
tios in the 50/50 coin-toss gamble paradigm (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1991, 1992).
In the coin-toss paradigm, participants have to consider
a situation in which they can potentially win or lose an
amount of money, depending on whether heads or tails
turns up after a coin toss. One side of the gamble is
given—for example, participants would read: “if heads
turns up you win 2 euro”. The other side then needs to
be filled out by the participants so as to make them in-
different toward taking or rejecting the gamble. They
read: “ if tails turns up, you lose ____”. Thus, partici-
pants directly compare potential gains to potential losses
in this paradigm, which creates a situation in which peo-
ple generally experience loss aversion (McGraw et al.,
2010). Loss aversion in this paradigm can be measured
by calculating the gain-loss ratio (G/L); a ratio that shows
the relative balance between the potential gains and the
potential losses. Ratios higher than 1 are indicative of
loss aversion; often a gain-loss ratio of approximately 2
is found (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991, 1992), indicating
that a gain needs to be about twice as large to balance a
loss.
There are two possible versions of the coin-toss
paradigm: (a) Participants are presented with a potential
gain and asked to fill how much they are prepared to lose
to take the gamble (the “fill-in-the-loss” version), or (b)
Participants are presented with a potential loss and asked
to fill how much they should win to take the gamble (the
“fill-in-the-gain” version). We argue that filling in losses
or gains influences people’s focus on the negative or pos-
itive side of the gamble, and subsequently influences loss
aversion. We are not aware of any previous literature that
compared these two measurement versions of loss aver-
sion, and until now it is thus unknown how these two
measurement versions of the coin-toss paradigm would
affect the measured magnitude of loss aversion.
We expect these different versions of the coin-toss
paradigm to yield different gain/loss ratios. We expect
that loss aversion will be stronger in the “fill-in-the-
loss” version than in the “fill-in-the gain” version, so the
gain/loss ratios will be greater. Our reasoning is that the
fill-in-the-loss paradigm—more than the fill-in-the gain
paradigm—induces a focus on losses, as it requires peo-
ple to consider multiple negative outcomes: Do I want to
lose $70? $60? $50 or less? This focus requires con-
sideration and elaboration of the negative outcomes, and
thereby self-generated negative information about poten-
tial losses may steer people’s attention away from poten-
tial gains so that they focus on the potential losses in-
stead. This focus on the potential losses will increase
their loss aversion, as reflected by higher gain/loss ra-
tios. Conversely, the fill-in-the-gain format may redirect
people’s attention from negative information about poten-
tial losses to positive information about potential gains
(Beck & Clark, 1997; Compton, 2000; Derryberry, 1993;
Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Teasdale, Segal & Williams,
1995; Toates, 1983). This required consideration and
elaboration of the positive outcomes, and thereby self-
generated positive information about potential gains may
steer people’s attention to potential gains and thus reduce
the gain/loss ratio.
In sum, the gain/loss ratios will be larger when people
consider negative outcomes in the “fill-in-the-loss” ver-
sions than when they consider positive outcomes in the
“fill-in-the-gain” versions. We call this the Format Hy-
pothesis.
2 Study 1
In Study 1, we presented our participants the two formats
and counterbalanced the order: Half of the participants
were first presented a fill-in-the-loss format and then a
fill-in-the-gain format, and the reverse for the other half.
In the fill-in-the-loss format first condition, participants
had to indicate how large the loss should be to balance a
given gain of C48.16. In the fill-in-the-gain format first
condition, participants had to indicate how large the gain
should be to balance a given loss of C20.16. After hav-
ing filled out the first gamble, the reported numbers were
used as input for the second gamble.1
1These amounts of money were chosen—based upon a pilot stud—
to avoid that participants would make heuristic decisions by quickly
splitting the amount. We expected that an amount of 48.16 or 20.16
would need more thinking than an amount of 50 or 25 euros.
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We also measured the amount of time participants
needed to make a decision concerning the amount of
money they filled out in the gambles under the two for-
mats. Although we realize that we should be careful not
to overinterpret data on response times, we reasoned that
the assumed attention to negative over positive informa-
tion might manifest itself in longer response times in the
fill-in-the-loss format than in the fill-in-the-gain format
(Fazio, 1990).
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Design and Participants
There were 41 participants, and 7 of them were excluded
from the analyses because their data differed more than
three standard deviations from the average on the main
dependent variables (gain/loss ratio and/or the time they
needed to make a decision). The 34 remaining partici-
pants were 19 women and 15 men, and their mean age
was 20.6 years. Participants individually filled out a
short questionnaire on the computer. The design was a
2 (format: fill-in-the-loss vs. fill-in-the-gain) by 2 (order:
loss format first vs. gain format first) design, with for-
mat as within-participants factor and order as between-
participants factor. Participants engaged in a filler task
that was unrelated to the experiment between filling out
the first and the second coin-toss gamble.
2.1.2 Procedure and dependent variables
In the loss format first condition, participants were first
presented with a coin-toss gamble in which they read: “If
heads turns up, you gain C 48.16, and if tails turns up
you lose C ..........(Lt1).” They were asked to fill in the
amount L that made the even chance to gain 48.16 euros
(G) or lose the amount L just acceptable—the amount L
needed to balance the gain. Subsequently, they were pre-
sented with the second gamble that had a fill-in-the-gain
format. We programmed the computer in such a way that
the given loss always was the loss they filled out in the
first gamble (Lt1). We calculated the individual G/L ra-
tios in both formats. The G/L ratio was 48.16/Lt1 in the
fill-in-the-loss format, the G/L ratio was Gt2/Lt1 in the
fill-in-the-gain format.
In the gain format first condition, participants first had
to fill in G; the amount of money that they would gain.
They read: “If heads turns up, you lose C 20.16, and if
tails turns up you win C ..........” After they filled out the
amount G, they were presented with the second gamble
that had the fill-in-the-loss format. We programmed the
computer in such a way that the given gain always was the
gain they filled out in the first gamble (Gt1). The G/L ratio
was Gt1/20.16 in the fill-in-the-gain format, the G/L ratio
was Gt1/Lt2 in the fill-in-the-loss format. Please note that
Table 1: Response times in seconds for coin-toss gambles
1 and 2 in Study 1 (N = 34). Participants filled out one
coin-toss gamble with a fill-in-the-loss format and one
coin-toss gamble with a fill-in-the-gain format. The order
in which participants filled out each format was varied.
Response time (in
seconds) Gamble 1 Gamble 2
Loss focus first 30.62 (20.49) 12.98 (6.98)
Gain focus first 23.57 (10.99) 19.41 (7.37)
any ratio above 1 means that the gains needs to be larger
than the losses to balance the gamble, which is regarded
as a sign of loss aversion.
Besides the gain-loss ratios, we also measured re-
sponse times—the time (in seconds) participants needed
to fill in the gambles.
2.2 Results
2.2.1 G/L ratios
The G/L ratios were analyzed by a repeated-measures
ANOVA with format (fill-in-the-loss format vs. fill-in-
the-gain format) as within-subjects factor and order (loss
format first vs. gain format first) as between-subjects fac-
tor. There was a main effect of format, F(1,32) = 4.28, p
< .05, η2 = .12, showing that the G/L ratios were higher
in the fill-in-the-loss format (M = 3.15, SD = 2.99, Med
= 2.00) than in the fill-in-the-gain format (M = 2.17, SD
= 1.27, Med = 1.98). This main effect shows that partic-
ipants needed more gains relative to a loss and showed
more loss aversion when they were focused on the loss
side of the gamble than when they were focused on the
gain side of the gamble. The main effect of order was
not significant, F(1,32) = .21, ns, and the interaction of
Format x Order was not significant either, F(1,32) = .84,
ns, showing that G/L ratios were not influenced by the or-
der in which participants filled out the loss and the gain
format.2
2As gain-loss ratios are sensitive to extreme outliers, we performed
a log transformation of the G/L ratio and repeated the ANOVA. The
results showed no significant effects. The difference between the two
analyses seems to have come about because the format effect was lim-
ited to those who showed relatively high G/L ratios in both conditions.
Specifically, with the log transforms, the difference between the two
(transformed) ratios was highly dependent on their sum: In a regression
of the difference on the sum, the (unstandardized) slope of 0.35 was
significant (t = 3.44, p = .0017), but the intercept of −.16 was not sig-
nificant. The intercept of essentially 0 suggests that those who do not
show loss aversion at all in the fill-in-the-gain condition will not show it
in the fill-in-the-loss condition either. The format effect does not seem
to create loss aversion out of thin air.
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2.2.2 Response time
The time needed to fill in the fill-in-the-loss format and
the fill-in-the-gain format was analyzed by a repeated-
measures ANOVA with the format as within-subjects fac-
tor, and order (loss format first versus gain format first)
as between-subjects factor. There was a main effect of
format, F(1,32) = 6.44, p < .02, η2 = .17, qualified by
an interaction of Format x Order, F(1,32) = 16.86, p <
.001, η2 = .35. Participants needed more time to fill in the
fill-in-the-loss format (M = 24.68, SD = 15.84) than the
fill-in-the-gain format (M = 18.59, SD = 10.64). In other
words, participants needed more time when they were fo-
cused on the loss side of the gamble rather than on the
gain side of the gamble. This effect of format was more
pronounced when participants had the fill-in-the-loss for-
mat first, F(1,15) = 15.14, p < .001, than when partici-
pants had the fill-in-the-gain format first, F(1,17) = 1.96,
ns (Table 1). This effect shows that people who focused
on the loss side in the first gamble and focused on the gain
side in the second gamble showed a larger time difference
between the two gambles than people who focused on the
gain side first and on the loss side in the second gamble.
2.3 Discussion
We found higher G/L ratios in the fill-in-the-loss format
than in the fill-in-the-gain format. Moreover, Study 1
showed that this difference in G/L ratios was not con-
tingent on the specific order of the formats. The results
of the response times also support our Format Hypothe-
sis, in which we argued that participants fill in gambles
with a fill-in-the-gain format more quickly and heuristi-
cally than gambles with a fill-in-the-loss format, in which
they may want to think longer about the potential negative
consequences.
A post-hoc explanation for the interaction effect for the
response times might be that it results from a combination
of the main effect of format—participants fill in the fill-
in-the-gain format quicker than a fill-in-the-loss format—
and a learning effect—participants are more familiar with
the task the second time, and can therefore fill in the sec-
ond gamble faster than the first. In the case of the fill-in-
the-loss format first condition, the format and learning ef-
fect work both in the same direction—the second gamble
has a fill-in-the-gain format—resulting in very quick re-
sponse times for the second gamble. In the case of the fill-
in-the-gain format first condition, the format and learning
effect work against each other in the second gamble—the
response times in the second gamble should be lower due
to the learning effect, but the loss format slows the pro-
cess down.
3 Study 2—Real coin-toss gambles
Study 1 concerned gambles in which people had to indi-
cate which amount of money they were willing to gain
or lose if they would out these gambles. These coin-toss
gambles were hypothetical gambles in which people an-
ticipate future outcomes—as is often the case in prior re-
search concerning risky decision making (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979). We deemed it worthwhile to investigate
whether similar behavioral effects are found when peo-
ple actually engage in the gamble. Therefore, we investi-
gated the effect of format in coin-toss gambles that were
actually carried out in Study 2. We again asked people
to indicate which amount of money they were willing to
gain or lose, and again, we manipulated whether they had
to fill in the gain side of the coin toss or the loss side of
the coin toss.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Design and participants
The study compared a gain and a loss format of a 50-
euro coin-toss gamble between participants. There were
26 participants (mean age = 25.76 years, 11 males, 12
females, 3 participants had missing data on gender).
3.1.2 Procedure and dependent variables
We made use of two prior existing work groups of a
course that was unrelated to the topic of this experiment.
In one workgroup (N = 14) we carried out the fill-in-
the-loss condition, and in the other workgroup (N = 12)
we carried out the fill-in-the-gain condition. The work-
groups took place on two consecutive days, and students
in the first workgroup (the fill-in-the-loss condition) were
asked not to mention the experiment to students in the
other workgroup (the fill-in-the-gain condition). Before
we started the experiment, participants first filled in a
consent form in which they read that they were going to
engage in a coin-toss gamble. At the start of the exper-
iment, the experimenter or the research assistant showed
the participants a note of 50 euro. We told them that we
were doing an experiment in which one of them would
actually receive the 50 euro to use it in a coin-toss gam-
ble.
All students received a sheet of paper with the instruc-
tions of the coin-toss gamble. They read that the experi-
menter would flip a coin, and that there was a 50% chance
of winning and 50% chance of losing. We then randomly
picked the name of one student—from a bag containing
identical sheets of paper with each student’s name on a
separate sheet—but did not reveal who it was yet. Par-
ticipants then filled out what amount they were willing to
lose—in the fill-in-the-loss format—or what amount they
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needed to win—in the fill-in-the-gain format—to engage
in the gamble.
The experimenter then collected all the sheets of pa-
per with the gain/loss ratios, and revealed the name of
the participant whose coin-toss gamble would be carried
out. This participant was called in front of the classroom
and was given the 50 euro note. The experimenter read
aloud the amounts of money to be won or lost if heads or
tails would turn up. In addition, to check whether the par-
ticipant understood the odds, the experimenter wrote the
odds on the whiteboard. Then the experimenter flipped
a coin, and the chosen participant either received or paid
money, depending on the coin-toss and the amounts that
were filled in on the sheet of paper. Finally, all partic-
ipants received 1 euro for their participation, and were
thanked and debriefed.3
Participants took part in either the fill-in-the-loss con-
dition, or the fill-in-the-gain condition. We recorded the
amounts participants filled in before engaging in the coin-
toss gambles. In the fill-in-the-loss condition, partici-
pants were told that they would engage in a coin-toss
gamble in which the potential gains were 50 euros, and
that they had to decide how much they would be willing
to risk losing. In the fill-in-the-loss condition, they read
“If heads turns up, you gain 50 euro, and if tails turns up
you lose C ......... .” They were asked to fill in the amount
L that made the even chance to gain 50 euro (G) or lose
the amount L just acceptable.
In the fill-in-the-gain condition, participants were told
that they would engage in a coin-toss gamble in which
the potential losses were 50 euro, and that they had to
decide how much they needed to win in order to engage
in the coin-toss gamble. Participants in the fill-in-the-gain
condition read: “If heads turns up, you lose 50 euro, and
if tails turns up you gain C ..........” They were asked to
fill in the amount G that made the even chance to lose 50
euro (L) or gain the amount G just acceptable.
We also recorded gender and age.
3.2 Results
Two participants in the fill-in-the-loss condition indicated
that they were willing to lose maximally 10 eurocents,
which would result in a gain/loss ratio of 5000. These
two participants were excluded from the analyses. The
gain/loss ratios were analyzed by ANOVA with format
(fill-in-the-loss vs. fill-in-the-gain) as between-subjects
factor. There was a main effect of format, F(1,22) =
22.23, p < .001, η2 = .50. As in Study 1, participants
in the fill-in-the-loss format had higher gain-loss ratios
(M = 29.44, SD = 20.02, Med = 29.17) than participants
in the fill-in-the-gain format (M = 2.13, SD = 1.48, Med =
3Participants knew they were allowed to withdraw from the experi-
ment at any point in time. None of the participants withdrew.
1.80).4 This result means that people who focused on the
loss side of the gamble were more loss averse and needed
larger gains to balance a loss than people who were fo-
cused on the gain side of the gamble.
3.2.1 Discussion
The real coin-toss gambles of Study 2 show a similar ef-
fect as the anticipated coin-toss gambles. As in the an-
ticipated coin-tosses, there seems to be a large difference
between a fill-in-the-gain format and a fill-in-the-loss for-
mat. Gain-loss ratios are much higher when people fill
in the loss side of the ratio, rather than the gain side of
the ratio—indicating that they are more loss averse when
they fill in the loss side than when they fill in the gain side
of the coin-toss. The results of the real coin-toss gambles
corroborate the findings of the anticipated coin-toss gam-
bles, validating the effects of Study 1.
4 Study 3
Study 1 and 2 showed that loss aversion—as measured
by the G/L ratio in an anticipated and a real coin-toss
paradigm—is predictably influenced by the format that
is used to measure loss aversion. The differences be-
tween the fill-in-the-loss format and the fill-in-the-gain
format support the idea of a measurement-induced fo-
cus on gains or losses. Moreover, consistent with our
idea that people may elaborate more when they consider
losses—we observed that people took more time to fill in
the gamble when they filled in the loss side of the gamble.
In Study 3 we considered an alternative way to test our
reasoning about why a fill-in-the-loss format increases
loss aversion compared to a fill-in-the-gain format. If
people are more preoccupied with losses, this preoccu-
pation would also imply that they may be more affected
by the size of the stakes when they consider losses than
when they consider gains. For this purpose we turned
to recent research that employed the coin-toss paradigm
to show that the gain-loss ratio can be moderated by the
size of the stake. Harinck et al. (2007) recently showed
that the amount of money that was at stake in a coin-toss
gamble moderated loss aversion. Their results showed in-
creasing G/L ratios for increasing stakes in the gambles;
for stakes of 1 euro, the G/L ratio was approximately 1,
but for 50 euros the G/L ratio was approximately 2. In
other words, Harinck et al. showed that loss aversion is
stronger for high stakes than for low stakes. Harinck et
al (2007) explained the increasing loss aversion for larger
amounts of money on the basis of two considerations: (1)
4We performed a log transformation of the G/L ratio and repeated
the ANOVA. The results again showed an effect of format, F(1,22) =
53.77, p < .001 , η2 = .71.
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in general, people are more motivated to discount losses
than to discount gains, but (2) discounting losses is more
difficult for high outcomes than for low outcomes.
We expect that loss aversion, as measured by the G/L
ratio, will be more strongly influenced by the amount
of money at stake under the fill-in-the-loss format than
under the fill-in-the-gain format (Format x Amount Hy-
pothesis). In line with the earlier work by Harinck
et al. (2007), our reasoning is that the fill-in-the-loss
paradigm—more than the fill-in-the gain paradigm—
induces a focus on losses as it requires people to consider
multiple negative outcomes (do I want to lose $70? $60?
$50 or less?). People want to discount those potential
losses, and will be better at discounting small amounts of
money rather than large amounts of money. As a result,
they will need relatively more potential gains to balance a
potential loss when stakes increase. Thus, increasing the
stakes in the fill-in-the-loss format will result in increas-
ing gain-loss ratios.
On the other hand, the fill-in-the-gain paradigm—more
than the fill-in-the-loss paradigm—induces a focus on
gains as it requires people to consider multiple positive
outcomes (do I want to gain $50 $60? $70? or more?).
People are happy to accept several potential gains and
will think about it less than when considering several po-
tential losses (see Study 1). As a result, they may make
quicker and more heuristic decisions when considering
potential gains, and therefore we expect them to be less
sensitive to the amounts at stake than when considering
potential losses.
4.1 Method
4.1.1 Design and participants
The experiment had a 2 (Amount of money: 10 cent
vs. 50 euros) by 2 (Format: fill-in-the-loss vs. fill-in-
the-gain) by 2 (Order: 10 cent first, vs. 50 euros first)
within-participants design with the amounts of money as
within-participant factor and focus and order as between-
subjects factors. Fifty-six students (25 males, 31 females)
from Leiden University participated; their mean age was
23.3 years. Participants received a small gift (candy bar)
for participation.
4.1.2 Procedure and dependent variables
Participants were randomly assigned to the fill-in-the-loss
format of the coin-toss paradigm or to the fill-in-the-gain
format. They participated in two (anticipated) gambles in
which a coin would be tossed; in one coin toss a small
amount of money was at stake—10 cents—and in the
other coin toss a large amount of money was at stake—
50 euros. The formats were presented as in Study 1 and
2. We presented the two amounts of money in ascending
Figure 1: G/L ratios as a function of the amount of money


































order for half of the participants and descending order for
the other half of the participants.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 G/L ratio
The G/L ratios were analyzed with a repeated-measures
ANOVA with the amounts of money (C 0.10 vs. C 50.00)
as within-subjects factor and order (ascending vs. de-
scending) and format (fill-in-the-loss vs. fill-in-the-gain)
as between-subjects factors. The results showed a main
effect of amount of money, F(1,52) = 11.65, p < .001,
η2 = .18 and interaction of Amount x Format, F(1, 52)
= 4.36, p < .05, η2 = .08, but no main effect of format,
F(1,52) = .27, ns (see Figure 1). The main effect of order
and the interactions including order were not significant,
all Fs < 1, showing that the gain-loss ratios were not af-
fected by filling in a small gamble or large gamble first.5
The main effect of amount showed that the G/L ratio
was smaller for 10 cents (M = 1.36, SD = 1.02, Med =
1.00) than for 50 euros (M = 2.67, SD = 2.77, Med =
1.67), the interaction showed that this effect was more
pronounced in the fill-in-the-loss format, t(27) = -3.53, p
5As G/L ratios can be sensitive to extreme values, we also per-
formed a log-transformation and analyzed the log10(G/L) with a sim-
ilar repeated-measures ANOVA with the amounts of money (C 0.10
vs. C 50.00) as within-subjects factor, and format (fill-in-the-loss vs.
fill-in-the-gain) and order (.10–50 vs. 50–.10) as between-subjects fac-
tor. The analysis of the log10(G/L) showed a main effect of amount of
money, F(1,52) = 24.51, p < .001, η2 = .32, and a main effect of format,
F(1,52) = 5.59, p < .03 , η2 = .10, qualified by an interaction of Format
x Amount, F(1,52) = 14.06, p < .001 , η2 = .21. The main effect of or-
der was not significant, F(1,52) = .08, ns., nor was the interaction with
order, all Fs < 1.55, all ps > .20.
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< .001, than in the fill-in-the-gain format, t(27) = -1.14,
ns. Thus, when people are focused on the loss side of the
gamble, they are more sensitive to the amount of money
that is at stake, and their loss aversion increases with
larger amount of money at stake. On the other hand, when
people are focused on the gain side of the gamble, their
loss aversion is less sensitive to the amount of money that
is at stake. These findings are in support of the Format x
Amount Hypothesis; people’s G/L ratios seem to be more
sensitive to variations in the amount of money that is at
stake when the gambles are presented in a fill-in-the-loss
format than when they are presented in a fill-in-the-gain
format.
Moreover, we replicated the effect of Harinck et al.
(2007), who showed that participants had G/L ratios
lower than 1 when small amounts of money were at stake
in coin-toss gambles. Harinck et al. (2007) used only the
fill-in-the-loss format. In the current study, the G/L ra-
tio of 10 cents in the fill-in-the-loss format (M = .86, SD
= .36, Med = 1.00) was lower than 1, t(27) = -2.01, p =
.054. The G/L ratio of 10 cents in the fill-in-the-gain for-
mat (M = 1.86, SD = 1.21, Med = 2) was higher than 1,
t(27) = 3.72, p < .01. This result means that participants
showed reversed loss aversion when they were focused
on the loss side of gambles in which they could gain 10
cents. It seems that in such small gambles a small loss is
balanced by an even smaller gain.
4.3 Discussion
In Study 3, we again showed that the strength of loss aver-
sion increased when the larger amounts of money were at
stake, but only when participants had to fill in the loss
side of the gamble and not when they filled in the gain
side of the gamble. These findings are in support of the
Format x Amount Hypothesis. The results of Study 3 also
showed that the order in which the amounts of money
are presented—increasing or decreasing—does not affect
our main finding. These results replicate and qualify the
prior findings of reversed loss aversion by Harinck et al.
(2007). The current results show that reversed loss aver-
sion was found when people had to consider the loss side
of a coin-toss gamble, but not when they had to consider
the gain side of a coin-toss gamble.
5 General discussion
Loss aversion plays a key role in decision making. Al-
though loss aversion is a robust phenomenon with pro-
found effects on the decisions we make, the strength
of loss aversion can be moderated by contextual fea-
tures (e.g. the amount of money that is at stake in
the decision (Harinck et al. 2007), or the individual in-
tentions of decision makers (Novemsky & Kahneman,
2005). These moderating factors show that context mat-
ters when it comes to loss aversion, we now revealed an-
other moderator—the effect of the measurement format,
which focuses people’s attention to losses or gains.
In three studies, we used coin-toss gambles, in which
there are equal chances (50/50) to gain or lose money, to
assess gain/loss ratios as a measure of loss aversion. We
varied the extent to which participants had to consider po-
tential losses or potential gains in the gambles by varying
the measurement format. In the fill-in the-loss format,
the potential gains in the gamble were given and people
had to fill in the loss side of the coin-toss gamble. In the
fill-in-the-gain format, the potential losses in the gamble
were given and people had to fill in the gain side of the
gamble.
Our studies consistently showed, using within- and
between-subject designs and anticipated and real coin-
toss gambles, that loss aversion in symmetrical gambles
was larger when people filled in the fill-in-the-loss for-
mat compared to the fill-in-the-gain format—supporting
the Format Hypothesis. The results of the response times
in Study 1 also support our Format Hypothesis; partici-
pants fill in gambles with a fill-in-the-gain format more
quickly than gambles with a fill-in-the-loss format. This
finding fits with the idea that people decide more heuris-
tically when they think about potential gains, rather than
potential losses.
Our Format Hypothesis holds for anticipated gambles
with anticipated outcomes and for real gambles, as shown
in Study 2. We investigated whether our coin-toss gamble
would yield different results with anticipated outcomes—
as in Study 1 and 3—or with real outcomes—as in Study
2. We found a similar effect of format—larger G/L ra-
tios in the fill-in-the-loss format than in the fill-in-the-
gain format—in a coin-toss gamble in which participants
actually could win or lose 50 euros. The G/L ratio of a
coin-toss gamble with a fill-in-the-gain format was close
to 2, which was found in Study 1 and 3 as well, and this
G/L ratio is in line with prior research by Kahneman and
Tversky (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991, 1992). The G/L
ratio in the fill-in-the-loss format in the real gambles was
higher than 2, replicating the main effect of format in an-
ticipated gambles of Study 1 and 3. If anything, the ef-
fects in the fill-in-the-loss format seem stronger in the real
coin-toss gambles compared to the anticipated coin-toss
gambles, and the studies using anticipated gambles may
thus be a conservative test of the effects under investiga-
tion.
The Format Hypothesis was further supported in Study
3, by showing that participants were more influenced by
the amount of money that was at stake in the fill-in-the-
loss format than in the fill-in-the gain format. These
results are also in line with earlier work by Harinck et
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al. (2007). They showed increasing gain-loss ratios in
coin-toss gambles when larger amounts of money were at
stake. Study 3 replicates their findings for the fill-in-the-
loss format, but shows that gain-loss ratios remain stable
when a fill-in-the-gain format is used.
5.1 Theoretical implications
The current studies add to our knowledge of the causes,
boundaries and consequences of loss aversion. First, we
showed that in a seemingly symmetrical situation—in
which people fill in the gain or the loss side of a 50/50
bet—their loss aversion is stronger when they needed to
fill in the loss side compared to the gain side. Earlier
research by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) showed that
people generally prefer a gain/loss ratio of approximately
2 to 2.5. In this earlier work (Tversky & Kahneman,
1992, p. 306), however, the measurement induced a gain
focus; participants had to fill in how much they wanted
to gain given a 50% chance to a given loss. Our research
can qualify these earlier findings; we replicated this ratio
in the anticipated and in the real coin-toss gambles when
a fill-in-the-gain format was used. We did not, however,
find it when a fill-in-the-loss format was used. In the
case of a fill-in-the-loss format, the ratio became larger
than 2, and increased even more when larger amounts of
money were at stake, and increased even more when real
amounts of money were at stake.
The finding that loss aversion increases when individu-
als think about the potential losses in the coin-toss gamble
rather than about the potential gains, in line with the neg-
ativity bias (Baumeister et al., 2001; Ito, Larsen, Smith
& Cacioppo, 1998; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). The neg-
ativity bias posits that individuals are more affected by
negative information (such as potential losses) than by
positive information (such as potential gains). The find-
ing that loss aversion increases when larger amounts are
at stake when individuals are focused on losses, but re-
mains the same when individuals are focused on gains is
also in line with the negativity bias.
Our reasoning is also in line with another theory about
risky decision making; query theory (Johnson, Häubl,
& Keinan, 2007; Weber, Johnson, Milch, Chang, Brod-
scholl & Goldstein, 2006). Query theory states that peo-
ple engage in a series of queries (or questions) when eval-
uating a risky decision and choosing one of the options.
This theory assumes that the final evaluation or prefer-
ence in the risky decision is the result of how people pro-
cess the information about the risky decision (Johnson
et al., 2007). In our study, the queries in the fill-in-the-
loss version could be 1) How do I evaluate the amount
to be won? 2) Which loss would balance this gain? The
queries in the fill-in-the-gain could be: 1) How do I eval-
uate the amount to be lost? 2) Which gain would balance
this loss? It seems that people think more about—and are
more affected by—potential losses when they are focused
on the loss side of the gamble rather than on the gain side
of the gamble.
Our findings may also be compared with a promotion
or prevention focus, as described in Regulatory Focus
theory (Higgins, 1998; Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner
& Higgins, 2010). Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins,
1998) states that people can be promotion-focused—
focused on acquiring gains and the attainment of goals—
or prevention-focused—focused on avoiding losses and
the prevention of failure. In the last decade, scholars have
studied the link between a person’s regulatory focus and
risk-taking behavior in economic or non-economic con-
texts (Bryant & Dunford, 2008; Idson, Liberman & Hig-
gins, 2000; Halamish, Liberman, Higgins & Idson, 2007;
Hamstra, Bolderdijk & Veldstra, 2011). The general find-
ing is that promotion-focused people take more risks than
prevention-focused people, although there are circum-
stances that cause prevention-focused people to take very
large risks (Scholer et al., 2010). In line with the research
on regulatory focus, our findings show that people who
are focused on the potential gains rather than the poten-
tial losses are willing to engage in riskier gambles when
comparing gains and losses.
At this point, it may be interesting to consider alter-
native explanations for our findings.6 One might won-
der, for example, whether our findings could be the re-
sult of anchoring-and-adjustment (Slovic & Lichtenstein,
1971; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). If people take the
given amount as anchor—for example 10 euro—and ad-
just it upward in the fill-in-the-gain format—for example
add 5 euro to the given amount of money—and adjust
it downward with the same amount in the fill-in-the-loss
format—subtract 5 euro from the given amount of money.
This procedure would result in a gain/loss ratio of 1.5
(15/10) in the fill-in-the-gain format and 2 (10/5) in the
fill-in-the-loss format.
Although this process of anchoring-and-adjustment
could explain the main effect of format, it cannot by itself
explain the interaction effect of Format x Amount. The
gain-loss ratios remain stable for the gain format when
larger amounts of money are at stake, but for the loss for-
mat, the gain-loss ratios increase when larger amounts of
money are at stake. Thus, the difference between the ra-
tios in the gain and loss format increases (non-linearly),
due to the increase in just the loss format. If anchoring-
and-adjustment would take place, we would expect a
more stable gain-loss ratio for the loss format, and a more
stable or smaller difference between the gain and the loss
format than we currently find.7.
6We thank an anonymous reviewer for these suggestions.
7If people would add or subtract for example 25 euro to a large
amount of money, for example 50 euro—this procedure would result
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Another explanation for the format effect could be one
of thought-induced polarization (Tesser, 1976). This pro-
cess would be that the more people think about losses—
as in the fill-in-the-loss format—the worse these losses
become, resulting in stronger loss aversion. On the other
hand, the more people think about gains—as in the fill-in-
the-gain format—the better these gains become, resulting
in less loss aversion. The effects of the amount of money,
however, show that this thought-induced polarization for
gains seems less likely; the gain-loss ratio (as indicator of
loss aversion) remains rather stable at approximately 2 for
increasing amounts of money. We would have expected
a decreasing loss aversion for higher amounts of money
in case of thought-induced polarization in the fill-in-the-
gain format, but instead, loss aversion was not affected
by the amount of money in this format.
5.2 Conclusion
The strength of loss aversion can be influenced by the
measurement format; it matters whether you compare
losses to gains or gains to losses. Loss aversion—as
measured by G/L ratios in real or anticipated coin-toss
gambles—is stronger when people have to consider the
loss side of the gamble than when they have to consider
the gain side of the gamble. Our research also shows that
loss aversion increases when larger amounts of money
are at stake, but especially when people fill in the loss
side of the gambles. Loss aversion did not vary with
the amount of money at stake when people filled in the
potential gains in the gamble. Thus, it seems that com-
paring losses to a gain is different from comparing gains
to a loss, and the focus of the comparison influences the
amount of loss aversion that people experience. We con-
clude that researchers should be careful when measuring
loss aversion—how loss aversion is measured determines
its strength.
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